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POLITICAL DYNAMICS WITHIN THE BALKANS: THE CASES OF
BOSNIA & HERZEGOVINA, MACEDONIA, BULGARIA, SERBIA,
AND MONTENEGRO
DR. LISEN BASHKURTI*
INTRODUCTION

The origin, history, political doctrines, and geopolitics of the Balkan
region make its current political dynamic extremely complicated. The Balkan Peninsula lies between Western and Eastern Europe and contains a
complex composition of populations. The main reasons for the multifarious
nature of Balkan political dynamics are the presence of various civilizations, ethno-cultural identities, contradictory geopolitical orientations, and
unique affiliations with other peoples and countries in Europe and the rest
of the world.
The historical trends of Balkan political dynamics have had three interconnected dimensions: national, regional, and geopolitical. National
political dynamics influenced regional dynamics from one side, while geopolitics influenced regional dynamics from the other side. Similarly, both
the regional and geopolitical dynamics have transformed the national political dynamic.
The national, regional, and geopolitical dynamics in the Balkans historically have produced mostly negative results. Within the last century,
regional political dynamics culminated in three Balkan wars and dramatically affected the two world wars. National political dynamics provoked
these regional wars, which in turn impacted those same national dynamics.
Geopolitical dynamics negatively fed into this dramatic process, as well.
National, regional, and geopolitical dynamics have transformed political spectrums within Balkan countries many times, have changed the forms
of the regimes in control many times, and have changed the political map
of the region three times. Unfortunately, these transformations and changes
have never been accomplished peacefully through political and diplomatic
means, but rather through internal sociopolitical confrontations and external conflicts and wars. The national, regional, and geopolitical dynamics in
* Deputy Foreign Minister of Albania and Director of the Diplomatic Academy.
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the Balkans were characterized by policies of force and not by force of
policy. Balkan leaders systematically violated international law and ignored
diplomatic practices. 1 This is why the Balkan region is well-known as one
of problems and conflicts. The term "Balkanization" entered political terminology as a synonym for the degeneration of an area toward permanent
instability and wars.
As a consequence of three dimensions of political dynamics clashing
in various ways from the collapse of the Ottoman Empire to the end of the
Cold War, both foreign policy, and security policy in the Balkans have systematically failed. This small region, although in the center of Europe, is
paradoxically one of the most destabilized areas in the world.
Historically, the traditional European Powers behaved in the Balkans
like elephants in a glass shop. The European Union ("EU") still lacks a
clear vision on the region, offering mostly political rhetoric and moral recommendations on the prospect of future European integration. 2 But nobody
in the EU has stated specifically how this process can proceed in light of
unresolved problems in the Balkans. This stems from a lack of foreign and
security policy within the EU itself.
Given these circumstances in Europe, most Balkan peoples and countries after the end of the Cold War, especially during the war in Former
Yugoslavia, turned to the United States of America and NATO in hopes of
a quicker resolution. The American and NATO presence played a role in
stopping the wars in Bosnia & Herzegovina, prevented tragedy and ethnic
1. For example, a Special Commission defined the border of the Balkan States, including Albania, at the Treaty of Peace between Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro, Servia and Turkey, May 30, 1913,
218 Consol. T.S. 159. During the First and Second Balkan Wars as well as during World War I, this
border map was ignored systematically, violating the United Nations Charter's Principles for Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity, U.N. CHARTER art. 2, paras. 1, 4, and violating the Helsinki Final Act,
Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe: Final Act, Aug. 1, 1975, 14 1.L.M. 1292, 1293-95.
2. In statements, comments, and press releases, European Union Commissioners Javier Solana
and Chris Patten have repeated the notion that Kosovo's future is with the European Union, without
offering any concrete details regarding how this might be achieved. European Commission, Speech by
the Rt.
Hon.
Chris Patten, CH before the Plenary European Parliament, at
http://europa.eu.int/comnm/extenal relations/news/pattern/sp04-166.htm (Mar. 30, 2004). In a speech
before the European Parliament, Patten noted that:
It is always tempting after horrible events like [the March unrests] to conclude that we should
rip up our strategy and come up with a new plan. I do not believe that we can give up on our
insistence about a multi-ethnic Kosovo in which all ethnic groups can live freely and without
fear. Nor do I believe that we should abandon the idea of 'standards before status'. On the
other hand, I don't think that we should send a signal that final status discussion will be delayed indefinitely. That would risk a grave worsening of tension. Nothing that happened earlier this month can change the geography of Kosovo. We all have a shared interest in making
sure that Kosovo does not become a black hole in the middle of SE Europe, where organised
crime flourishes and ethnic division is entrenched. We have to go on working patiently for the
long term future. Whatever Kosovo's final status, it's future lies in Europe.
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cleansing in Kosovo, and defended state integrity and democracy in Macedonia. Additionally, three main international documents-the Dayton
Peace Accords for Bosnia & Herzegovina (1995),3 United Nations Security
Council Resolution 1244 for Kosovo (1999),4 and the Framework Agreement for Securing the Future of Macedonia's Democracy (2001) 5-were
signed with much support by the United States. These documents brought
peace, stability, and democratic development in the Balkans.
The time has come to review seriously the historical Balkans experience, not simply for research purposes or curiosity, but rather to avoid repeating mistakes and to find some better ways of resolving the situation
definitively, offering a clear prospective for the entire region. Political dynamics are among the most important factors to analyze and consider in the
course of this review.
I.

POLITICAL DYNAMICS IN BOSNIA

& HERZEGOVINA

Peace, stability, and democracy in the Balkans remain fragile. This is
primarily due to contradictory political dynamics within the Balkan countries. Bosnia & Herzegovina is one of the most typical cases of fragility in
the Balkans. Since the Dayton Peace Accords were signed in 1995 by the
parties to the conflict and by representatives from the international community, Bosnia & Herzegovina has operated under foreign administration
and is secured by foreign peacekeeping forces.

3. The Dayton Peace Accords were signed by Bosnian President Alija lzetbegovic, Serbian
President Slobodan Milosevic, and Croat President Franjo Tudjman, who were the high representatives
of each party to the conflict, as well as by Western representatives from the United States of America,
Great Britain, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, and the European Union. Under the Dayton
Peace Accords, Bosnia & Herzegovina was recognized as an independent state with a border that had
been defined under the Former Yugoslav Constitution. Bosnia & Herzegovina was organized into two
parts: the Bosnian and Croat Federation and the Serbian Republic- See General Framework Agreement
for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dec. 14, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 75, 89, 91, 180, 181 [hereinafter Dayton
Peace Accords].
4. The U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1244 after a NATO air strike liberated Kosovo
from the Serbian military machine in June 1999. The Resolution placed Kosovo under a United Nations
security protectorate and established an international civil presence during a period of transition to selfgovernance. See S.C. Res, 1244, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 401 Ith mtg. 5, 10, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244
(1999). The adoption of Resolution 1244 marked the start of the United Nations Interim Administration
Mission in Kosovo and the start of the Kosovo Force, a NATO-led international force responsible for
establishing and maintaining security in Kosovo.
5. Framework Agreement for Securing the Future of Macedonia's Democracy, Aug. 13, 2001,
at 1, available at hlnp://faq.macedonia.org/politics/framework-agreement.pdf [hereinafter Ohrid
Framework Agreement]- After the conflict resumed in summer 2001 between Macedonians and ethnic
Albanians, Macedonian and Albanian political party representatives and representatives of the EuroAtlantic communities signed this Agreement in the city of Ohrid in Macedonia.
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The main goals of the Dayton Peace Accords are to maintain peace
and stability, to restore the internal integrity of the country, to build state
institutions and promote democracy, to return refugees and displaced persons, and to cooperate closely with the International Court of Justice in
prosecuting war criminals. 6 Toward reaching these noble goals, the international community supported creating two state entities-the Bosnian and
Croat Federation and the Serbian Republic. This process of building new
state institutions started from the top.
In the Bosnian and Croat Federation and the Serbian Republic, the
moderate political parties won the first political elections. The traditional
nationalist parties, which had waged the war, lost. This political victory by
moderate democratic parties facilitated establishing some federal institutions. High Representatives of the international community led the creation
of a federal government, parliament, president, and later on, a federal court,
military, and security staff.
Initially, the Dayton Peace Accords had brought peace and relative
stability to Bosnia & Herzegovina. War was over. Normalcy had returned.
Life was improved. The economy was better. But the state of the country
was far from ideal. Within a few years, further progress had stagnated.
Today, the integrity and functionality of the state institutions remain on the
verge of possible disintegration. Continued hatred, hostility, and nationalism threaten democracy. The process of returning refugees and persons
displaced from their residential areas of origin already has failed. The war
criminals are still hidden from the peacekeeping troops. This political and
economic stagnation has increased the general level of disappointment,
which in turn works as an advantage for the old nationalist political parties.
This reversal of political dynamics brought at the second general election victory for the three main nationalist political parties: the Party for
Democratic Action (of Bosnians), the Croat Democratic Party (of Croats),
and the Serbian Democratic Party (of Serbs). Although this turnabout surprised the international community, those who saw what really was going
on within Bosnia & Herzegovina expected it. There were three main causes
of this reversal of political dynamics in Bosnia & Herzegovina. First, the
goals of the Dayton Peace Accords were not reached in time. Second, the

6- The Dayton Peace Accords General Framework Agreement mandates cooperation with entities authorized by the U.N. Security Council to investigate war crimes. See Dayton Peace Accords,
supra note 3, art. IX. In addition, there are Annexes specifically devoted to "Inter-Entity Boundary,"
"Elections," "Constitution," "Human Rights," "Refugees and Displaced Persons," and "International
Police Task Force." See id. at Annexes 2-4, 6-7, 1I.
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nationalist parties promoted their own separate interests. Finally, geopolitical and other influences from abroad played a role.
Concerning failing to reach the goals of the Dayton Peace Accords,
those reforms, as we have noted, were concentrated mainly at the federal
level in order to preserve state integrity and to promote modest democratic
developments. The lack of bottom-up reforms left state entities to improvise for a long time. This spontaneous process paved the way for the most
extremist elements-namely, nationalist parties and prior military leaders-to reenter active political life without any serious obstacles. Finding
space to operate during the transition, these former contingents of the war
kept their power over local entities via demagogy, pressure, and money.
Within local entities, they then undermined implementation of the Dayton
Peace Accords. To date, the reforms envisaged by the Dayton Peace Accords remain only partially realized on the federal level and have not been
vertically implemented downward to local entities. Thus, the Dayton Peace
Accords neither restored integrity to state institutions nor advanced democratic society.
Concerning the nationalist parties' agendas, we know they have been
and remain in favor of keeping the country separated rather than united.
More typical of the Serbian Republic, the political will of nationalist parties
to cooperate in favor of a Bosnia & Herzegovina integral state never existed. Bosnia & Herzegovina contains two main federal structures: the Bosnian and Croat Federation on one hand and the Serbian Republic on the
other. Within those two structures exist three traditional and nationalist
state entities, which are stronger than the federal institutions above them.
These three state entities are still primarily under the influence and leadership of nationalist political parties. These political leaders ignore in many
cases the political, legal, and financial obligations of the federal institutions
above them. 7 The two federal entities have their own armies, police forces,
modest security structures, and customs officials, as well as some formal
and informal fiscal institutions. However, local nationalist authorities are
curbing the process of returning refugees and displaced persons. It seems
the local nationalist authorities are more interested in keeping their territorial entities ethnically cleansed. These same local nationalist authorities
make it very difficult for peacekeeping troops to arrest hiding war criminals
and send them to the International Court of Justice.
7. Bosnia & Herzegovina File, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Albania, Directorate of Analysis
and Prognosis, Fact-Finding Mission in Sarajevo (May 29, 2003). The report for this fact-finding
mission is confidential material. The author has quoted only the part that can be open to public in
accordance with the Ministry's own rules for classified documents.
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Concerning geopolitical influences, Bosnia & Herzegovina is still in a
very difficult and unfavorable geopolitical situation. Although not as bad as
during the war, geopolitics remain very complicated. Everybody knows
that during the war the two main nations, Serbia and Croatia, led by two
extremist nationalist leaders, Milosevic and Tudjman, directly and indirectly fueled the conflict. At the very beginning stage of the war, the Serbian leader and the Croat leader intended to create their own "greater
nations" by splitting Bosnia & Herzegovina into two parts. Each was responsible for the war, the crimes, the genocide, the ethnic cleansing, and
the refugees and displaced persons.
Now the war is over, but the consequences are still alive. The political
and moral influence of the two main nations, Croatia and Serbia, are still
present in Bosnia & Herzegovina. Each has political and moral power over
its ethnic entity and could contribute to the process of achieving internal
state integrity for Bosnia & Herzegovina. Very unfortunately, Croatia has
not used its political and moral power as positively as it could, while Serbia
has harmfully misused its political and moral power.
Due to this geopolitical situation, the political dynamics in Bosnia &
Herzegovina have reversed. Capitalizing on this specific geopolitical situation, local nationalist leaders of the three entities continue on with their
separate domestic political agendas and national geopolitical orientations,
without much trouble from the weak federal institutions. These reversed
political dynamics have promoted two contradictory trends within one
state: integration and fragmentation. These two contradictory trends are
represented by two political mainstreams: the democratic parties represent
integration, while the nationalist parties represent fragmentation. The future
result of these contradictory trends is not yet clear.
So far, the institutional vacuum in Bosnia & Herzegovina, the interests
of nationalist parties, and the geopolitical situation, by weakening the democratic parties and federal institutions, have created favorable conditions
for nationalists to consolidate their political position. This dangerous political trend favors nationalist forces in Serbia, which are deeply interested in
using the Serbian Republic in Bosnia & Herzegovina to serve their political
aims over the entire region.
Unfortunately, the nationalists in Serbia, both those in government and
those in opposition, seem to be inspired by the same old-fashioned political
doctrines and by pursuing the same foreign policy toward Bosnia & Herzegovina. They want to keep the Serbian Republic in Bosnia & Herzegovina
under their own influence, to dictate her political orientations, and to make
her ignore the central state institutions and the international community.
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This confidential cooperation between nationalists in the Serbian Republic
of Bosnia & Herzegovina and nationalists in Serbia proper gives war
criminals Karadzic and Mladic the freedom to operate. 8

II.

POLITICAL DYNAMICS IN MACEDONIA

The Republic of Macedonia exhibits different political dynamics, specifically dependent on its unique origin, history, politics, and geopolitics.
The name "Republic of Macedonia" pretends to continue from the old Macedonians who lived in the Balkans since the beginning of its ancient civilization. This myth of Macedonian origin historically promoted a way
toward national identity. About one century ago, the myth of origin on one
hand and a historical belief in it on the other both were transformed into a
national political doctrine. Macedonian nationalism characterized the first
and the strongest political party among Macedonians. Its political goal was
to establish the independent state of Macedonia.
The dream of Macedonians to have their own symbols of identity, integral territory, and state institutions came true after the Second World
War, when the communist leader of Yugoslavia, Joseph Broz Tito, established the Republic of Macedonia quite equal to the other Republics within
Yugoslavia. 9 This achievement encouraged the Macedonian nationalists to
declare their independent state immediately after the dissolution of Yugoslavia at the beginning of 1990.
The Republic of Macedonia is surrounded by Albania, Kosovo, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece. Its population comprises two large ethnic
groups-Macedonians and Albanians-as well as other minorities. The
political dynamics in the Republic of Macedonia have passed through two
phases and have been influenced by three main factors.

8.

Nicholas Wood, 60 Bosnian Serbs Dismissed ForAid to War Crimes Figure, N.Y. TIMES, July

1, 2004, at A6.
9. Yugoslavia was formed in 1945 from the prewar Kingdom of Yugoslavia under the name
Democratic Federal Yugoslavia. Its name changed in 1946 to the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia and again in 1963 to the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Serbia and Montenegro,
History from 1918 to 2003, at http://www.gov.yu/start.php?jc=e&id=38 (last visited Oct. 19, 2004).
Since 1945, Yugoslavia was composed of six Republics and two autonomous Provinces. FED. PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA CONST. art. 2 (1946), reprinted in YUGOSLAVIA THROUGH DOCUMENTS:
FROM ITS CREATION TO ITS DISSOLUTION 212 (Sne~ana Trifunovska ed., 1994)_ Macedonia was recog-

nized as the Socialist Republic of Macedonia with a constitutional status equal to that of Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia, Montenegro, and Bosnia & Herzegovina. Id. In 1991, Macedonia proclaimed its
independence within the border of Former Socialist Republic of Macedonia. Declaration on the Sovereignty and Independence of the Republic of Macedonia, Sept. 17, 1991, reprinted in YUGOSLAVIA
THROUGH DOCUMENTS, supra, at 345.
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The first phase of political dynamics, starting at the end of 1991 and
lasting through the end of 1999, saw the international recognition and consolidation of the independent state of Macedonia. Independence, peace,
stability, and territorial integrity were the main targets of the political dynamics in Macedonia during this phase. The second phase, running from
1999 to the present, saw a clash between Macedonia and its Albanian
community. Policies of force and radical agendas were the main targets of
the political dynamics during this phase.
The three main factors to impact the first phase of political dynamics
in Macedonia have been (1) internal political dynamics; (2) regional political dynamics; and (3) international political dynamics directed toward
Macedonia.
Concerning internal political dynamics, the Republic of Macedonia
over the last decade has a distinctive history. Immediately after the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the collapse of the communist regime, two large
ethnic communities, Macedonians and Albanians, founded their own large
political parties. The Macedonians founded VMRO-DPMN, the SocialDemocratic Party, and the Liberal Party. The Albanian community founded
the Party for Democratic Prosperity, which was pursued later by its own
faction, the Democratic Party. These were political parties of ethnic origin,
composition, leadership, doctrines, and electorates.
Some additional political parties were founded based upon European
models, defined not purely on ethnicity but rather on modern political alternatives. Very unfortunately, these modem political parties remained
small and not influential. Thus, from the beginning, the political spectrum
in the Republic of Macedonia took ethnic, rather than politically principled,
shape.
As the war in Yugoslavia continued, Macedonians and Albanians, organized in their own parties, were determined to cooperate and reach a
political compromise despite their unresolved problems. This policy created a temporary climate-of relaxation between the two main political ethnic groups. It was reflected all over the country. This phenomenon was
extremely important for the Republic of Macedonia, which as a result escaped the involvement in the larger regional conflict.
Concerning the regional political dynamics, the Republic of Macedonia faced complicated situations over the last decade. To the south, the
Hellenic Republic of Greece did not immediately recognize the independence of the country because it had complaints about the name ("Macedonia") and the national flag (red field with yellow sunshine in the middle).
The Greeks considered themselves the only people descended from that era
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of history. They considered the name "Macedonia" and the flag to be of
Greek origin. Consequently, the temporary name "Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia" was internationally imposed. Greece created numerous artificial obstacles at the beginning stage of the independent state of
Macedonia.
The Republic of Albania pursued quite a different foreign policy toward Macedonia. Albania was among the first countries to recognize the
independent state of Macedonia. 10 The two countries established diplomatic relations immediately, which developed into cooperation on many
fronts. Albania created free access for Macedonia to the Adriatic Sea, opening up a necessary economic zone. Both countries supported joint infrastructure development projects and worked together in favor of peace,
stability, and cooperation in the region. By pursuing such a policy toward
Macedonia, the Republic of Albania played a double role. First, it helped
Macedonia to maintain its independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. Second, it contributed to preserving peace and stability in the Western
Balkans.
In contrast, over the last decades the border between Macedonia and
Kosovo has been problematic. Before June 1999, Kosovo was under the
Milosevic regime's increasingly repressive policies. Under these circumstances, the way to Macedonia as well as Albania served as the path for
Kosovars to get out from under Milosevic and into the rest of the region
and Europe. The human relations, including immediate and extended family relations, between Kosovars and Albanians in Macedonia and the region
as a whole always have been strong. One characteristic of Albanians is that
in times of crises they strengthen their ethnic relations no matter where
they live. Thus, during the crisis and the war in Kosovo, Macedonia saw
instability from time to time, despite measures taken by the states to close
borders and to adopt special security mechanisms.
With the case of Macedonia during the last decade, instability in Kosovo was clearly problematic. Conversely, a peaceful, stable, and developed
Kosovo contributes to peace, stability, and development in Macedonia. The
main reasons for such strong and direct bilateral impacts on political dy10. In spring 1992, the Parliament of the Republic of Albania recognized the Independent State of
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and established diplomatic relations via a special resolution.
Albania was among the first member states of the United Nations to recognize Macedonia's independence- This move sent a very positive signal to ethnic Albanians living in Macedonia. Newspaper Criticizes Macedonia's "'Solidarity" With Serbia on Kosovo Issue, BBC MONITORING INTERNATIONAL
REPORTS, Nov. 1I,2002, availablein LexisNexis AllNews Database and on file with the Chicago-Kent
Law Review ("Albania officially recognized the independence of Macedonia, whereas Belgrade and
Athens have always conditioned the recognition of independence with the church or the name issues.").
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namics between Kosovo and Macedonia are the geopolitical links and the
Albanian human ties and relations existing on both sides of the border.
Bulgaria caused no special political impacts in Macedonia during the
last decades. In spite of the historical debates between the two countries,
both sides overcame that history and pursued pragmatic relations. Bulgaria
was interested in escaping the-Balkans' problems and focusing on domestic
reforms and integration into NATO and the European Union. Macedonia,
on the other hand, needed good relations with Bulgaria because of its own
complicated domestic and geopolitical situation.
For a decade following 1990, Macedonia's other neighbor, Serbia,
was fully committed in wars with Croatia, then with Bosnia & Herzegovina, and later on with Kosovo. Serbia had neither time nor opportunity to
influence directly the political dynamics in Macedonia. Serbia impacted
Macedonia only in terms of regional possibilities for reforms, foreign investments, and integration.
Concerning international political dynamics toward Macedonia, it is
known that the Republic of Macedonia enjoyed support from the international community from the beginning. The United Nations, the European
Union, the United States of America, NATO, the Organization for Security
and Co-operation in Europe, and the Council of Europe all contributed
positively toward maintaining peace and stability in this newly established
independent state located within the Balkans. It is difficult to imagine how
Macedonia would be today without the international community's presence
and contribution. The Macedonia case illustrates that when the international community is present and active at the beginning of a crisis, using
preventive diplomacy and protective measures, peace can prevail, even in
conflict areas such as the Balkans.
The second phase of political dynamics in Macedonia started in 1999
and continues today. Many factors helped the Republic of Macedonia initially to maintain peace, stability, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. The
international community recognized Macedonia's independence and took a
present and active role. The two main ethnic political groups reached a
compromise. The experienced leadership of the Republic of Albania and
Bulgaria pursued moderate policies. This macrostability was very important not only for the country, but also for the entire region.
But this state of macrostability in Macedonia could not counterbalance
for very long the cracks inside Macedonian society that started to erode
democracy. Immediately after the Kosovo war, Macedonia faced waves of
political problems. The Albanian community, the second largest community within Macedonia, voiced repeated requests for human, civil, and na-
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tional rights within the Macedonian state, including the rights of education,
language, and symbols as well as the right to participate in the army, police
forces, and administration. These rights had been systematically violated or
at least neglected by the Macedonian side.
The majority Macedonian side responded to the Albanian requests
negatively, replacing dialogue with a policy of using force. This exercise of
power in turn provoked radical reactions in the Albanian community. The
main Albanian political parties lost the confidence of their people, and the
situation spiraled out of control. Radical military leaders established an
Albanian guerilla army (similar to the Kosovo Liberation Army, but without any connections between the two). The Albanian guerillas' political
goal was to force Macedonian authorities to honor the Albanian community's repeated demands for civil, national, and human rights. Thus, the
political process was replaced by armed conflict between Macedonian state
institutions and the Albanian community and its guerrilla army. This conflict between these two large entities threatened to destroy everything
achieved earlier.
Quick international community intervention stopped the conflict and
brought the parties to the table to talk peace. The result was an international
agreement known as the Ohrid Framework Agreement ("OFA"), signed on
August 13, 2001 by the parties in the conflict and by representatives of the
international community. The OFA begins:
The following points comprise an agreed framework for securing the future of Macedonia's democracy and permitting the development of
closer and more integrated relations between the Republic of Macedonia
and the Euro-Atlantic community. This Framework will promote the
peaceful and harmonious development of civil society while respecting
the ethnic identity and the interests of all Macedonian citizens.1I
The OFA is principally a document of compromise, which obliged two
large ethnic communities to pursue reforms in the form of constitutional
amendments, legislation, and other confidence building measures. 12
Annex C of the OFA is an extensive schedule of confidence-building
measures designed to preserve the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the Macedonian State. 13 Specifically, with international
support the parties agree, inter alia, to strengthen local self-government, to
respect the character of a multiethnic and pluralistic democracy via equita-

11. Ohrid Framework Agreement, supra note 5, at 1.
12. See id. at Annexes A-C.
13. See id. at Annex C.
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ble representation, and to ensure respect for human rights. 14 The OFA, if
correctly implemented, will integrate all ethnic groups, minorities, and
individuals into one democratic Macedonian society.
Following the OFA, a general election took place in Macedonia. The
Former Albanian army was disarmed and its leaders founded a new political party named the Democratic Party for Integration. The result of the
election changed the political spectrum in the government. The Democratic
Party (of Albanians) and VMRO-DPMN (of Macedonians) lost the election. The Social-Democratic League and the Liberal Party (of Macedonians) and the Democratic Party for Integration (of Albanians) won the
election and formed a new coalition government. The government's political agenda was to fully implement the OFA.
Initially, this process was touch and go. There was a lot of mistrust between the sides, misinterpretations of the principles and concepts, and slow
practical adoption and implementation of the OFA. This happened because
some parties who signed the OFA proceeded to change their positions.
VMRO-DPMN, after losing in the election, opposed the document. The
Albanian Democratic Party, despite also having lost, took the contradictory
position. Both VMRO-DPMN and the Albanian Democratic Party put in
doubt the possibility of establishing an integral functional Macedonian
State based on multiethnic and multicultural identity. Both parties instead
resurrected their previous attitudes in favor of having pure ethnic states
throughout the Balkans. Availing themselves of the opportunity created by
these contradictory positions within some of the OFA signatories, traditional Greek, Bulgarian, and Serbian political circles used their influence to
stifle the reform process. The old state administrative staff hesitated to
change the structure of state institutions. Some conservatives in the army,
police, and so-called "lion troops" (Macedonian paramilitaries remaining
from the time of civil disturbance), resisted, in very hidden and sophisticated ways, the reforms attempted within the army and police forces.
Exactly one year later, this undesirable situation provoked the same
crisis. In a dangerous regional provocation, antagonists put in doubt the
OFA, threatening to initiate the formation of new purely ethnic states
throughout the Balkans. But this time the crisis was managed politically
without any serious negative impact. To the contrary, this last crisis
prompted positive reflections by all the main state actors. There is now a
better shared conception among the societies and the international comru-

14. See id. at Annex C, §§ 1, 3.3, 5, 5.3.
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nity of adopting and implementing reforms derived from the OFA's
principles.
Three outside components influenced the second phase of political
dynamics in Macedonia as well: an improved situation in Kosovo, positive
regional cooperation, and advanced steps toward the integration of Macedonia into NATO and the European Union.
The improved situation in Kosovo has a direct positive political impact in Macedonia. Even the last Kosovo crisis of March 16-17, 2004 did
not cause any problems in Macedonia. That crisis remained domestic and
was managed quickly by the Kosovo leadership and the international
community.
Regional cooperation also influenced Macedonian political dynamics.
A triangle of diplomacy developed among the Western Balkan countries of
Macedonia, Albania, and Croatia, which are closely cooperating in the
fields of peace, security, stability, and integration. They utilized this triangle diplomacy to sign the Adriatic Charter, a document promoting rapid
15
integration of these three countries into NATO under U.S. leadership.
Macedonia's latest application for EU membership will further promote
positive political dynamics within the country.
Political dynamics in Macedonia will continue to depend upon full
implementation of the OFA, regional cooperation, and integration into
European and Euro-Atlantic structures. During these processes of transitions and reforms, Macedonia depends on the international community's
presence and active role.
III.

BULGARIAN POLITICAL DYNAMICS

Bulgaria always has been concerned about the Balkans. 16 Being one of
the oldest Balkan states and a historical actor during the most important
15. The Charter was signed by Albania, Croatia, Macedonia, and the United States of America on
May 2, 2003, in Tirana, Albania. See A Charter of Partnership Among Albania, Croatia, Macedonia and
the United States, May 2, 2003, reprinted in PUB. RELATIONS OFFICE OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS OF THE REPUBLIC OF MACED., THE CHARTER OF PARTNERSIIIP AMONG ALBANIA, CROATIA,

MACEDONIA AND USA (2004), at http://www.mfa.gov.mk/upload/dokumenti/Partnership final.pdf. The
idea for such an agreement was proposed by President Bush at a NATO Summit in Prague in November
2002, where he met with Albanian President Moisiu, Croatian President Mesic, and Macedonian President Trajkovskij. See id. at 6, 11.
16. CHELOVEK NA BALLKANAKH V EPOK+IU I KRIZISOV I ETNOPOLITICHESKII STOLKNOVENII
[PEOPLE IN THE BALKANS DURING THE ERA OF CRISES AND ETHNO-POLITICAL CLASHES] 377-85 (St.
Petersburg, Alekja 2002); MAKEDONIIA: PUT' K NEZAVISIMOSTI: DOKUMENTI [MACEDONIA: THE WAY
TO INDEPENDENCE: DOCUMENTS] 121-22 (1997); EVGENHI PETROVICH BAZHANOV, AKTUAL'NYE
PROBLEMY MEZHDUNARODNYKH OTNOSHENII V NACHALE XXI VEKA [CURRENT PROBLEMS OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AT THE BEGINNING OF THE 21ST CENTURY] 102-10 (2003); INSTITUT ZA
BALKANISTIKA, NATSIONALNI PROBLEMY NA BALKANITE: ISTORIIA I SUVREMENNOST [NATIONAL
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events of the Peninsula, Bulgaria considered herself a key country among
Turkey, Greece, Romania, Serbia, and Macedonia.
Historically, Bulgaria contributed strongly to the Balkan liberation
movement against the Ottoman Empire. At the end of the nineteenth century, Bulgaria was among the first provinces to become autonomous, free
from the Ottomans. She participated actively in the two Balkan Wars during 1911-1913 and was very energetic during the First World War.
The main Bulgarian political objective during these wars was the unification of population and territory within one Bulgarian state. The main
geographic and demographic target lay to the southwest, in Macedonia.
Due solely to this old nationalistic Bulgarian dream of unification, two
revolts and four wars took place within Bulgaria and around it. But Bulgaria's dream of unification with Macedonia went unrealized, resulting in
painfully splitting Macedonia between the Greeks and Serbs.
Despite historical failure, Bulgarian nationalists never gave up their
dream of creating one big Bulgarian state. Between the two world wars and
especially during the Second World War, the Bulgarian nationalistic political trend has been overwhelmingly directed toward correcting history by
creating a greater Bulgarian state. This is precisely why Bulgaria supported
Hitler during the Second World War. The war time was the only period
Bulgarian nationalists temporarily realized unification of a greater Bulgarian nation.
The defeat of the Axis Powers in the Second World War caused Bulgaria to be considered internationally as a losing country. Therefore, after
the war Bulgaria was designated within the socialist camp of the Soviet
Union (and in its previous territory, leaving Macedonia definitively outside
its border). In 1945, Macedonia established itself as a Republic within the
frame of the Socialist Federal Yugoslavia under Tito's leadership. Macedonians' old dream for their identity began to come true.
During the Cold War, Bulgaria was one of Moscow's most servile satellites. It remained as such until the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. After
the Cold War ended, and particularly during the process of Yugoslavia's
dissolution, there were some signals and even some political parties and
political initiatives working toward revising the border between Bulgaria
and Macedonia. Macedonian nationalists, deeply committed to proclaiming
PROBLEMS IN THE BALKANS: HISTORY AND THE PRESENT] (Khrustyo Manchev ed., Sofia, Arges 1992);
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an independent Macedonian state, strongly opposed these parties and
initiatives.
Despite these nationalistic political trends, Bulgaria did not, in fact,
involve itself directly in Macedonia's conflict within Yugoslavia, as had
often happened during the second half of nineteenth century and the first
half of twentieth century. Consequently, the political map of Bulgaria, its
territory, and its population remained unchanged from their state during the
Cold War.
Bulgaria played a generally constructive role during the 1990s. Bulgaria was the first country to adopt the regional initiative towards not altering Balkan borders. At the end of 1991, Bulgaria signed treaties with
Greece and Turkey and signed bilateral agreements with Romania, Albania,
Macedonia, Croatia, and Slovenia. Bulgaria's strategy was and still remains
oriented toward integration into NATO and the European Union. The country seems committed to leaving history behind and looking to the future.
Despite this positive and constructive role toward the Balkans, Bulgaria is very sensitive about the political dynamic in the region. This sensitivity derives mostly from geopolitical circumstances. Three components
influence Bulgarian geopolitics: the Turkish dimension of Bulgarian policy,
including the Turkish minority living in Bulgaria; the current and future
status of Macedonia; and Albanian developments in the Balkans, including
ethnic Albanians living in Kosovo and Macedonia. Bulgaria has never considered any of these three components in isolation and as a result has pursued a very balanced policy toward the Balkans.
Turkey, and a sizeable Turkish minority in Bulgaria, historically have
impacted Bulgarian politics and been a main concern of Bulgarian policy.
Bulgaria's positions toward the Western Balkans always have been influenced by the geopolitical implications of Turkey being in the region and
especially by the political impact the Turkish minority has within Bulgaria.
For example, it is precisely Turkey and the Turkish minority who influenced Bulgaria to pursue a neutral and balanced policy toward Macedonians and Albanians within Albania.
If Bulgaria were to support Macedonians while ignoring Albanians, it
could face unpredictable reaction by Turkey and the Turkish minority,
which are particularly sympathetic toward Albanians and Islamic peoples
throughout the Balkans. Conversely, if Turkey openly were to support
Kosovar and Macedonian Albanians against Macedonians, it could provoke
a Macedonian reaction that could lead to a very dangerous regional conflict. Such a conflict would trigger a "domino effect," involving the entire
Balkans but with Turkey in a central role: Turkey-Bulgaria-Macedonia;
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Turkey-Greece-Albania; Turkey-Macedonia-Serbia; Turkey-MacedoniaGreece; Turkey-Bosnia-Croatia. Cognizant of this probable scenario, Bulgaria attempts to prevent, to the extent possible, Turkey's involvement in
Balkan affairs. Toward that end, Bulgaria has employed sophisticated
methods to pave the way for the Turkish population living in Bulgaria to
leave for Turkey. It is in Bulgaria's interest to reduce the Turkish influence,
presence, and role in the Balkans and to reduce the size of the Turkish minority living in Bulgaria.
Bulgaria considers the direction of the Balkans still undefined. Macedonian developments have a particularly important effect on Bulgarian
political dynamics. Despite the traditional Bulgarian doctrine regarding
Macedonia as an integral part of the Bulgarian nation, Bulgaria after the
Second World War accepted the reality of a separate Macedonia. Although
Bulgaria has given up a claim to Macedonia, its interest in Macedonia resurfaces from time to time. This was clearly evident during the latest Macedonian crisis of 2001.
The 2001 conflict between Albanians and Macedonians caused a
shock in Bulgaria. Many politicians considered it an early warning sign of a
coming conflict within Bulgaria, similar to that within Yugoslavia. The
political dynamic in Macedonia has always been a threat to Bulgaria. A
move toward federalism and ultimately Macedonia's separation into two
ethnic communities, Macedonians and Albanians, could destabilize Bulgaria. For Bulgarians, such a separation could on one side pave the way for
Albanians' demographic expansion and on ,the other side encourage the
Turkish minority in Bulgaria. Jordan Velickov, a Bulgarian expert on international affairs, has focused attention on Albanians' demographic development within Macedonia as well as throughout the Balkans. Velickov, in
accord with previous Bulgarian researchers and analysts, considers the
Albanian-Turkish demographic fusion in the Balkans a serious threat to
Bulgarian interests.
Bulgaria has always considered the complex question of Kosovo's future as critical to the entire region. Some voices in Bulgaria favor an independent Kosovo, arguing that its independence is a prerequisite to peace
and stability in the Balkans. However, without being against a possibly
independent Kosovo, Bulgaria first wants Kosovo to respect the existing
border with Macedonia. Bulgaria opposes a fusion between Kosovo and
Albanians in Macedonia and therefore desires a very clear border between
Kosovo and Macedonia. Bulgaria has a deep national interest in Macedonia. Bulgaria is ready to recognize an independent Kosovo only in exchange for Kosovo's respecting its Macedonian border. Bulgaria seeks to
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avoid however possible a gradual fusion of the Albanians in Kosovo with
those in Macedonia and wants to cut off Albanians' links to the Turkish
minority in Bulgaria as well as to Turkey proper.
By the same logic, Bulgaria opposes breaking up Kosovo. It considers
dividing up Kosovo, including Belgrade's recent proposed division of Kosovo into various cantons, a dangerous precedent that could lead to border
changes across the entire region, sparking another conflict. The country
most immediately threatened would be Macedonia. Dividing up Macedonia
would provoke regional confrontations among Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece,
Albania, and Turkey. Next in line for dissolution would be Bosnia & Herzegovina, with Serbs, Croats, and Bosnians replaying the recent conflict.
This chaotic scenario would produce no winners. All would be losers.
IV.

SERBIAN POLITICAL DYNAMICS THROUGHOUT THE BALKANS

Serbians are among the oldest Slavic peoples in the Balkans and have
been developing their identity, culture, economy, and institutions since the
middle ages. As with other Balkan peoples, Serbians have survived a very
difficult history.
Serbia has enjoyed independence since the Congress of Berlin in
1878, where Great Britain, Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, and Turkey signed a treaty providing: "The High Contracting Parties
recognize the independence of the Principality of Serbia, subject to the
conditions set forth in the following Article." 17 Like all other Balkan countries, the Kingdom of Serbia, led by nationalists, was very active in the war
against the Ottoman Empire. But when the Ottoman Empire collapsed, the
Kingdom of Serbia continued its offensive strategy, replacing previous
Balkan solidarity with national rivalry during the two Balkan Wars from
1911 to 1913. Serbia's intention was to expand its territory by occupying
the lands of surrounding peoples. Supported by Russia and not opposed by
traditional European powers, the Kingdom of Serbia enlarged its territory
to include Kosovo and Macedonia.
After the First World War, the Kingdom of Serbia initiated the creation of the Serbian-Croatian-Slovenian monarchy. In 1929, the monarchy
changed the name of the Kingdom to the State of Yugoslavia. This was the
first Yugoslavia-the first Balkan state based on federalism. In that federal
state, Serbians continued to dominate important spheres such as foreign and
17. See Treaty for the Settlement of Affairs in the East, arts. XXXIV, XXXV, July 13, 1878, 153
Consol. T.S. 171, 184. This followed the Treaty of San Stefano between Russia and Turkey, which had
ended the last Russo-Turkish War.
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security policy. Serbians considered Yugoslavia as a matter of fact to be a
continuation of the Kingdom of Serbia. This continued dominance by Serbs
prompted an anti-Serb political movement. Croats and Slovenians preferred
either a true democratic federal state or independence. This conflict between the Serbian authoritarian regime's philosophy and the Croats' and
Slovenians' democratic federalism concepts became aggravated from time
to time and was never solved by compromise.
During the Second World War, this conflict between Serbians and
Croats produced two political movements in Yugoslavia: nationalism and
communism. The communists, led by Tito, won the war and were in favor
of federalism. They established the Yugoslav Federation, which comprised
six Republics: Croatia, Slovenia, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia,. and
Bosnia & Herzegovina. Two provinces, Kosovo and Vojvodina, were included within the Republic of Serbia and given special status.
Although the communists organized and managed the Yugoslav Federation's multiethnic makeup for nearly half a century, the conflict between
communists and nationals was never put to rest.18 Immediately after the
Cold War ended, this underlying sentiment erupted into armed conflict.
One by one, Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, and Bosnia & Herzegovina
proclaimed independence.
Serbia opposed the dissolution of Yugoslavia and tried to impose federalism by force. Serbia justified such tactics in light of the foreign debt
inherited from the communist regime and the nationalistic rivalry for political dominance. Serbia's war machine abused people of different nationalities and entities, the main strategic goal being a Yugoslavia with
"Greater Serbia" as its center. Milosevic, the Yugoslav leader and former
communist turned nationalist, led one of the most bloody, nationalistic
wars in Europe. His strategy to realize by force his nationalistic doctrine
was challenged every step of the way in Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia &
Herzegovina. In the spring of 1999, the campaign ultimately failed as the
conflict spilled over into Kosovo, where NATO intervened militarily.
Milosevic's regime fell one year after the NATO intervention. Democratic forces materialized in the Serbian political arena, attempting domestic reforms and modernization. In 2003, the Yugoslav Federation
disappeared from the Balkan political map after eighty-three years of existence. A looser union called simply Serbia-Montenegro replaced the Yugoslav Federation.
18. See Ivo BANAC, THE NATIONAL QUESTION IN YUGOSLAVIA: ORIGINS, HISTORY, POLITICS
141-225 (1984).
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Vojvodina, a Hungarian province, remains within the union. Kosovo,
an Albanian province, operates under an international protectorate led by
the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo ("UNMIK")
and NATO's Kosovo Force ("KFOR"), in accordance with Resolution
1244.19
After the war, the political dynamic in Serbia took the form of political crises. The nationalist parties-the Socialist Party, the Radical Party,
and nationalist segments of some self-dubbed democratic or moderate parties-still dominate the political arena. True democratic forces remain fragile, only mildly influential, and under strong pressure at home and from
abroad. The Serbian people are demonstrating an increasing lack of confidence in national policy and boycotting massively the elections. Under
such depressing political circumstances, Serbia is producing only minority
governments with limited political support.
The current minority government resulted from a compromise by the
Socialist Party, whose leader Milosevic is in the Hague accused of war
crimes and genocide. The socialists and nationalists in Serbia, guided by
the same doctrine, are using the continuing political crisis to reach their old
political goals. This time their means is not a policy of force, which already
failed, but the force of policy, diplomacy, and other mechanisms.
Serbian nationalists in and around the country still want Belgrade to
remain the ethnocentric capital for all Serbs living in the region. They hope
to realize the old Serbian dream of a "Greater Serbia," only within a new
framework and using new terminology. Serbian socialists and nationalists
are very close allies. In addition, some self-proclaimed democrats are completely focused on regional geopolitics. They do not care about real domestic democratic reforms and true integration into the EU and NATO, despite
the fact that more than eighty percent of Serbian citizens are very much in
favor of a future with the European Union.
The old Serbian nationalist doctrine is still alive and active. It exists
within different political alternatives, disguised by sophisticated terminology. The main goal is the same as it was during Milosevic's regime: retain
as much of Yugoslavia as possible and include Serbians living everywhere
within the framework of this state. Serbian nationalism during recent times
is growing and active in the government and political arenas.
This complicated situation has enabled Serbia to prevent almost completely any cooperation with the Hague tribunal for war criminals. In her
last report to the United Nations Security Council in June 2004, Carla Del
19.

S.C. Res. 1244, supra note 4,

10, I1.
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Ponte declared that "the authorities of Serbia and Montenegro provided
almost no cooperation, and this country has become a safe haven for fugitives."'20 In an effort to remain in power, the Serbian government clearly
has made a very dangerous concession to Milosevic's party and its allies.
This opens the door for nationalists to justify their past political activity
and to legitimate their future. For democracy in Serbia, this legitimacy
21
poses a real threat.
The kneeling of the Serbian government in front of nationalists means
the continuation of Serbia's previous regional strategy. Serbian nationalists
directly and through the kneeled government are pursuing very complicated
tactics toward Bosnia & Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Kosovo.
Toward Bosnia & Herzegovina, Belgrade is trying to keep the Serbian
Republic in Bosnia & Herzegovina separated from the federal institutions
there as long as it can. It is this underground Serbian policy that influences
the Serbian Republic to continue its separate activity, prevent the NATO
Stabilization Force from capturing the war criminals Karadzic and Mladic,
22
and to receive more instructions from Belgrade than from Sarajevo.
Toward Montenegro, Belgrade is attempting all of the necessary maneuvers to prevent Montenegro's independence from Serbia. Through the
Serbian minority and political actors in Montenegro, as well as through
direct pressure on Montenegro authorities, Belgrade wants to keep its
strong influence, presence, and role within this small Adriatic Republic
with a very old independent state tradition. But the process toward a referendum seems to be inevitable. By June 2004, Montenegro Prime Minister
Djukanovic declared publicly that he was convinced that Montenegro citizens are in favor of independence. 23 Even in Serbia there are many partisans believing it would be easier for Serbia and Montenegro to be
20. Press Release, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Address by Carla
Del Ponte, Chief Prosecutor, to the United Nations Security Council (June 30, 2004), at
http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/2004/p863-e.htm.
21. See e.g., Beth Kampschror, Serb Voters Reject "Greater Serbia",- Embrace Europe,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 29, 2004, at 07 ("By electing pro-Western reformer Boris Tadic, Serbian voters rejected [the] Radical Party candidate. .. and the ultranationalist past he sought to recover,
giving Europeans a sense of relief... [Tadic's party was] part of the October 2000 'revolution' that

ousted Milosevic.").
22. See Press Release, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Address of
Theodor Meron, Judge, to the United Nations Security Council (June 29, 2004), at

http://www.un.org/icty/pressreaL/2004/p862-e.htm (recounting the failure of former Yugoslav state to
arrest and transfer war criminals).
23. Montenegro Still Wants Referendum on Independence, ONASA NEWS AGENCY, July 28,
2004, available in LexisNexis AllNews Database and on file with the Chicago-Kent Law Review ("The
Prime Minister of Montenegro, Milo Djukanovic, on Wednesday reiterated that he wants to hold a
referendum on the independence of the Balkan state, against the advice of the European Union.").
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integrated into Euro-Atlantic structures independently rather than as a
Union.
Toward Kosovo, Belgrade continues to influence domestic policy in
very contradictory ways. Through the Serbian minority and its political
representatives in Kosovo, through direct Belgrade intervention, and sometimes even through some segments within UNMIK in Pristina, sophisticated Serbian nationalists periodically suggest different options, models,
and alternatives for a "better solution" to Kosovo's status. Always bearing
in mind ethnic lines, the latest suggestion, approved even by the Serbian
Parliament, is the Draft-Proposal for the separation of Kosovo into Albanian and Serbian Cantons.
The Serbian nationalist strategy for the region, whether it is coming
from political, governmental, or parliamentary sources, ultimately is to
realize, by political and diplomatic means, the same goal the previous Serbian regime wanted to realize by force. Through this strategy, Serbian nationalists and other political groups want Montenegro, plus the Serbian
Republic in Bosnia & Herzegovina, plus Serbian Cantons in Kosovo to be
integral parts of a centralized Serbian state.
The old Serbian nationalist strategy is being pursued via dangerous
new tactics. These tactics include curbing the integration of Serbian minorities into the societies and states where they are living, making Serbian political parties and associations outside the Serbian state answerable only to
Belgrade, and provoking ethnic and political instability within all Balkan
states where Serb minorities and Serbian nationalist parties are scattered.
Continuing the old Serbian strategy via these sophisticated tactics is
curbing the democratization of the newly created Balkan states and Kosovo, is obstructing regional cooperation and Euro-Atlantic integration, and
could provoke a regional crisis at any time in the future if not dealt with
now. Given that nationalists and ultranationalists in Serbia are gaining
momentum again and always threatening the current Serbian minority government, the regional political situation in the most fragile areas in the Balkans can be reversed at any time.
This is not an unfamiliar problem because Serbia's current regional
policy is nothing new. But it is the most dangerous political phenomenon
influencing the political dynamics in the Balkans. Serbia's continuing nationalistic doctrine, supported also by other segments of Serbia's current
policy, is a direct threat to the integrity of the internationally recognized
state of Bosnia & Herzegovina and to the success of the Dayton Peace Accords. It causes serious provocations in Kosovo, the territorial integrity of
which is monitored by UNMIK and the Kosovo Force under United Na-
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tions Resolution 1244.24 It creates tensions in Montenegro, whose authorities want to organize a referendum on independence from Serbia in the year
2006. It keeps tension high in Macedonia where both ethnic communities,
Macedonian and Albanian, are working toward implementing the Ohrid
Framework Agreement to build pluralistic and multiethnic democratic institutions. For the entire Balkans, the continuation of the previous Serbian
strategy through new tactics is a source of tension, instability, and possible
conflict.
CONCLUSION

The above analysis shows that the situation in the Balkans remains
fragile. The political dynamic is full of potential conflicts, and there is no
clear, positive, and modem trend taking root across the region. How this
complex political dynamic in the Balkans will affect the future is unpredictable. Under these circumstances, democratic Balkan states, new political parties throughout the region, citizens, civil societies, institutions,
media, business communities, intellectuals, Western democracies, and international institutions dealing with the Balkans should be certain not to
neglect this political reality unless they want history to repeat itself.

24.

S.C. Res, 1244, supra note 4,

9(g).

